Chapter 6
The German Sinking of the William P. Frye
On March 10 Arthur Sewall and Company, managing
owners of the American merchant ship William P. Frye, sent a telegram to
Secretary of State Bryan to report that earlier that morning the German auxiliary
cruiser Prinz Eitel Friedrich had entered
On March 12 British Ambassador to Washington Cecil
Arthur Spring Rice sent an official letter to the State Department treating the
Prinz Eitel Friedrich. He called the State Department's attention
to the fact that the German cruiser was carrying upwards of 300 prisoners when
it entered Newport News. His point was that to carry American prisoners
aboard a cruiser was to expose them to unnecessary dangers.2
Danger to the prisoners failed to become an issue in
the William P. Frye case. After all, the men had been kept alive
aboard the German cruiser rather than killed. Furthermore, the German
warship was armed and the fact remained that any ship was at risk during this
war. The prisoners had arrived safely in Virginia so there was not going
to be a diplomatic issue made of this subject thereafter.
There was, however, going to be an issue made of the
sinking of the William P. Frye herself and the nature of her
cargo. The first task was to determine what purpose the cargo would serve
once it had reached Great Britain on March 23. Bryan cabled Consul
General Robert Skinner in London requesting information on the cargo's planned
change of ownership from American to British agencies. He actually wanted
to know whether the wheat was destined for the British Government or military.3
Skinner cabled back the next day with the information
Bryan requested. There was, he said, no evidence of the cargo belonging
directly or indirectly to the British Government. London purchased flour,
but not wheat. Skinner provided the names of the firms through which the
wheat would change hands, but the final destinations of grain cargoes were
usually determined after the ships reached port. He also said the
director of army contracts informed him privately of the extreme unlikelihood
that wheat would have been bought or contracted for army accounts.4
Bryan cabled Gerard in Berlin on March 31 with a claim to be given to the German Foreign Office immediately. This was a total claim amount for the following losses:
(1) The value of the ship, equipment, and outfit;
(2) The total value of the cargo;
(3) Traveling and other expenses of the ship's
captain;
(4) The expenses of Arthur Sewall and Company in
connection with making and filing claim affidavits;
(5) The personal effects of the ship's captain;.
(6) Losses due to deprivation of use of the William
P. Frye.
The total amount was set at $228,059.54 and Bryan
requested that the German Government pay this sum in full at the earliest
possible date. He instructed Gerard to cable back upon delivering the
claim.5
On April 5 Gerard cabled Bryan with Berlin's reply,
written by German State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Gottlieb E. G. von
Jagow. He held that the captain of the Prinz Eitel Friedrich had
acted well within the principles of international law. Von Jagow began
his arguments by stating that the William P. Frye was bound for the
ports of Queenstown, Falmouth, and Plymouth. All three ports were heavily
fortified and served as Royal Navy bases. Therefore Berlin believed the
cargo of wheat, which of course fell under the category of foodstuffs, was
destined for the British armed forces.6
The captain of the Prinz Eitel Friedrich,
however, could not determine the final destination of the cargo as only a
ship's manifest and initial destination were found aboard the William P.
Frye. He had decided that sinking the William P. Frye was the
best course of action, because he lacked sufficient manpower and storage space
to bring the wheat aboard his own vessel. Also, he would be compromising
the security and success of her operations if she were to carry possible
contraband.
Von Jagow stated that Berlin wanted to bring these
proceedings before the German prize court in Hamburg. There they would
determine whether the William P. Frye and her cargo were liable to
capture and whether the owners would be indemnified. He said if no proof was
forthcoming, Berlin would not be liable for compensation.
In closing, von Jagow intimated that this legal
situation was special in light of the July 11, 1799 Prussian-American Treaty of
Friendship and Commerce. Article 13 of this treaty, taken in connection
with Article 12 of the May 1, 1828 Prussian-American Treaty of Commerce and
Navigation, stated that "contraband belonging to the subjects or citizens
of either party cannot be confiscated by the other in any case but only
detained or used in consideration of payment of the full value of the
same." In other words, this meant the American owners of both ship
and cargo would receive compensation even if the German prize court declared
the wheat to be contraband. However, there still had to be a hearing to
examine the legality of the sinking and to declare an amount of indemnity.7
The William P. Frye case had already become a
secondary diplomatic problem. Von Jagow's note reached Washington only on
April 7 well after the Falaba was sunk (on March 28). That event
involved the loss of a U.S. citizen and obviously overshadowed the William
P. Frye case.
On April 28 Bryan cabled Gerard with a note for the
German Foreign Office. Bryan no longer felt it was necessary to tie up
cable correspondence with discussion on the William P. Frye case, so he
offered his advice.
Bryan began by stating that Washington did not see the
necessity for a prize court hearing. The sinking of the William P.
Frye was a violation of the obligations imposed upon Berlin in the
aforementioned treaties between the United States and Prussia. Therefore,
the United States possessed a valid claim for indemnity and Bryan felt the
question of the need for one had already been settled.
He concluded the note by promising that any additional
information Berlin requested would be provided. However, virtually all
information regarding this case was available only in the United States.
The owners and captain of the William P. Frye, other witnesses, and
documentary records were all there. Thus, Bryan asked that the
negotiations be transferred to the Imperial German Embassy in
Washington.8 This would free up the cables and expedite the settlement
process.
The loss of the William P. Frye was no longer a
major diplomatic problem. Not only had the Falaba case become the
most significant issue in German-American relations, but only a week later, on
May 7, the Lusitania was sunk, and the loss of American lives was
staggering when compared to any previous case.
ENDNOTES
1. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1915 Supplement (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1928), File No.
462.11Se8/1, p. 41.
2. Ibid., File No. 763.72/1592, p. 341.
3. Ibid., File No. 462.11Se8/12a, p. 355.
4. Ibid., File No. 462.11Se8/12, p. 355.
5. Ibid., File No. 46211Se8/6, p. 357.
6. Ibid., File No. 462.11Se8/16, pp. 360-61.
7. Ibid.