Chapter 9
Conclusion
The sinking of the
After Wilson threatened war Berlin backed off its
submarine warfare policies, promising to refrain from attacks on passenger ships
and to provide warning before torpedoing other vessels. For the time
being, the United States stayed out of the war. Wilson said there was
such a thing as being "too proud to fight." He saw his country
and himself as the last hopes for a mediated end to the European war.
The Allied powers, meanwhile, were trading freely with
the United States, confident that if Americans ever fought it would be on their
side. They hoped to bring about United States intervention against
Germany. German naval policy had brought
about a great diplomatic setback. All Berlin could do now was try to keep
the United States out of the war.2
In hindsight it is easy to see that Berlin should have
paid closer attention to the diplomatic repercussions of prior submarine
attacks, such as the Falaba and Gulflight. Had the Germans
understood how the death of Leon C. Thrasher overshadowed British ignorance of
American neutrality, they might have taken more precautions to prevent the Lusitania
incident from happening. But the incident did occur and Washington had,
as a result, placed Germany on a sort of probation.
That probationary period lasted until the beginning of
1917. The worsening economic situation in Germany brought about by the
British naval blockade, the stalemate on the Western Front in 1916, and the
notion that Germany could bring Britain to her knees before a militarily
unprepared United States could offer decisive military assistance, led Berlin
to scrap its promises regarding submarine attacks. On January 9, 1917,
Kaiser Wilhelm II, acting on the insistence of Generals Paul von Hindenburg and
Erich Ludendorff (the real powers in Germany), officially authorized German
submarines to attack neutral as well as enemy ships in the war zone. The
policy was announced to the world on January 31 to go into effect the next
day. This was the "Unrestricted Submarine Warfare" declaration.3
The German declaration destroyed Wilson's last hopes
for a mediated end to World War I. Washington now faced a crisis with
Berlin. The prospect loomed that German submarines would force the United
States into that horrible war. Angry over the German policy of
Unrestricted Submarine Warfare as well as the discovery of the Zimmerman
Telegram (a proposal for an alliance between Germany and Mexico in the event of
an American intervention) Wilson went to the Congress on April 2 for a
declaration of war. Four days later, on the 6th, the United States
formally declared war on Imperial Germany. From then on most Americans united
behind the war effort. Even the Bryan Democrats, who had earlier
supported impartial neutrality, accepted the futility of trying to stay
neutral.4
The war would drag on for more than a year before
Berlin accepted defeat and agreed to an armistice. The armistice signed
at Compi�gne on November 11, 1918, ended the fighting and cleared the way for
the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Woodrow Wilson's failed hopes for a
mediated end to the war no longer mattered, for now he could pursue his ultimate
dream of a post-war league of nations.
The question of whether a mediated settlement could
have been reached can never be determined with absolute certainty. Had
the Germans listened to American warnings after the Falaba incident and
avoided the Lusitania problem a whole host of other things still could
have drawn the United States into war. The fact remains, though, that
both sides might have favored mediation after the terrible 1916 battles on the
Western Front that bled them white with casualties in the millions. After
April 1917 any hope of this was gone for the Allies saw a chance for victory
with fresh American troops and equipment.
ENDNOTES
1. Colin Simpson, The Lusitania (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1972), p. 10.
2. James L. Stokesbury, A Short History of World War I
(New York: William Morrow and Company, 1981), p. 113.
3. Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and
Practice of Liberal Internationalism During World War I
(Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly
Resources, Inc., 1991), pp. 81-82.
4. Ibid., p. 87.