Chapter 4
Early Diplomatic Correspondence
On
After the Lusitania sinking, the United States
and Germany were on a collision course. President Woodrow Wilson even
sacrificed the service of Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan in order to
send a note to Berlin denying the right of belligerent powers to jeopardize
non-combatants through attacks on unresisting merchantmen. Bryan resigned
rather than sign the note, believing Germany had the right to prevent
contraband from reaching Allied ports. Wilson, however, was unflinching
in his resolve to protect the neutral rights of the United States.
It has long been held that the sinking of the Lusitania
marked the beginning of the diplomatic tensions that led to war between the
United States and Germany. Actually Washington had begun to sympathize
with the Allied Powers earlier in 1915. On March 28, 1915, a German
submarine torpedoed the British merchant ship Falaba, without giving the
crew and passengers time to escape. An American citizen was aboard the Falaba
when it sank. This incident caused Washington to lean toward the Allied
cause. None of the diplomatic problems with London at the time compared
with this because, whatever they might be doing, the British were not
jeopardizing the lives of American citizens. The Royal Navy merely
captured ships and took them to prize court rather than sinking them. One
can see the cooperation between Washington and London by examining the
diplomatic cable traffic regarding the Wilhelmina case, which the two
governments settled in a peaceful manner. The Falaba case never
came to a close, as slightly more than a month later the Lusitania case
became the focus of diplomatic correspondence between Washington and Berlin.
Late 1914/early 1915 cable traffic between Secretary
of State Bryan and the U.S. ambassadors to Berlin and London indicates a change
in attitudes from strict neutrality to pro- Allied tendencies. If the
American reaction to the Falaba sinking was any indication, the Germans
should have done everything possible to prevent a disaster on the scale of the Lusitania.
They failed to see the importance of the Falaba incident and this eventually
brought the massive industrial and military might of the United States against
them.
In August 1914 when World War I began in Europe the
position of the United States Government was clear; America would be
neutral. President Wilson called upon his countryman to be neutral in
thought as well as in deed. In retrospect, it would appear that the
United States was destined to enter the First World War. In 1914,
however, this was by no means clear.
Wilson also expected the warring European powers to
respect U.S. neutral rights. But theory was one thing and practice
another. A principal area of concern was American merchant shipping, the
United States then representing a very large portion of neutral trade with the
belligerent European nations. While it was naive for President Woodrow
Wilson to expect American shipping to be allowed safely through the war zones, it
was even more naive that belligerent ships carrying American passengers should
also be safe.
There was certainly historical precedent for this
situation. In 1812 the United States had gone to war with Great Britain
in part because of British failure to recognize the neutrality of American
ships. The British practice of impressment, whereby Royal Navy captains
would stop American vessels and take individuals from them for the Royal Navy
was a principal cause of war between the two nations.
From 1914 on the United States Government communicated
with both sides on the issue of neutrality, providing ample warning that
continued failure to recognize the U.S. neutral stance would cause strained
relations, which could lead to United States entry in the war.
On December 26, 1914, U.S. Secretary of State William
Jennings Bryan cabled Ambassador to Great Britain Walter Hines Page. The
communication dealt with London's wartime practice of diverting American
merchant vessels into British ports. Often these ports had no market for
the goods aboard the ships, causing heavy losses to American exporters.2
Bryan pointed out that Britain was normally a champion
of freedom of the seas and that being a belligerent nation did not give her the
right to interfere with commerce between countries not at war, except in cases
where British national safety was at stake. He stated that British policy
toward neutral ships and cargoes exceeded the manifest necessity of a
belligerent and placed restrictions on the rights of American citizens.
He also claimed that British actions were not justified under international
law.3 Finally, Bryan told
Page to impress upon London that if conditions of U.S. trade with neutral
European nations did not improve, it would "arouse a feeling contrary to
that which has so long existed between the American and British
peoples." He pointed out that British policies were already becoming
the subject of public criticism and complaint and the cause of depression in
certain industries that depended upon European markets.4
This problem with the British Government led the State
Department to prepare a letter to the same effect to the German
Government. While not in response to specific German actions, as was the
case with the letter to Page regarding British policy, it was nonetheless a
warning.
This communication to the German embassy, dated
December 28, was actually prepared in response to a German memorandum of
December 10. In the latter German ambassador Count Johann Heinrich von
Bernstorff inquired as to whether
In his response Secretary of State Bryan did not
promise a course of action to be taken regarding the British. He did,
however, assure the German Embassy that the
In remarks at a December 29 press conference President
Wilson reaffirmed the
The President denied the existence of any sort of
threat in the note, stating that this would be the position of any neutral
nation. As he put it, "There is nothing in it peculiar to our view
of international law."9
He apparently viewed the situation as an embarrassment to the
On the night of December 29 Colonel Edward Mandell
House, who had the title of Personal Representative of President Wilson to the
European Governments, met with British Ambassador to the United States Sir
Cecil Arthur Spring Rice. Having already discussed the issue of American
neutrality with Spring Rice, House found him unconcerned with
At this point in the war London did not feel any
serious strains in its relations with the United States. It was still
very early in the war and the major incidents that would require a great deal
of negotiation had yet to happen. Nevertheless, there is no doubting that
Most of
On February 2 United States Ambassador to Berlin James
Watson Gerard sent two telegrams to
The second telegram imformed
On February 6 Counselor for the State Department
Robert Lansing sent a letter to Gerard in Berlin.
Lansing pointed out that the only right enjoyed by
belligerent powers when dealing with neutral ships was that of visit and
search, unless an effective blockade was proclaimed and maintained, and that
this had not been accomplished. Finally,
Lansing concluded by expressing the earnest hope that
the Imperial German Government would give assurances that provision would be
made for the safety of American citizens and vessels. Only in the case of
visit and search should Americans be inconvenienced.16
During a February 9 news conference President Wilson
was reluctant to provide any clear-cut views on the German situation.
When asked if the declaration of a war zone was grounds for protest, he did not
offer a yes or no answer. He stated only that the State Department was
waiting for a more extensive explanation, as Gerard promised. He was not
confident in assessing German intentions, however. As he put it, the
German proclamation "bristles with things one would like to know more
about."17
On February 10 Secretary of State Bryan sent his own warning
to Gerard. He reiterated all of the main points raised by Lansing, but he
took these a step further. Bryan stated that the United States was not
guilty of any of the unneutral practices of which Berlin accused certain other
nations. He also said the United States had not pursued actions such as
those of the belligerents that restrained neutral trade.18
Bryan warned Berlin against taking immediate hostile
action against U.S. flag vessels. He said that if the Imperial Navy were
to sink an American vessel or kill American citizens, that Washington would
view it as an indefensible violation of neutral rights and that such actions
could destroy the existing friendly relations between the two countries.19
Finally Bryan assured Gerard that a cable to Walter
Hines Page in London the same day dealt with use of the American flag.
That message told of reports that the captain of the Cunard Liner Lusitania
was under orders from British authorities to raise the U.S. flag when his ship
approached the British coast. This policy would doubtless jeopardize the
vessels of neutral nations traversing those waters in that the Germans would
assume they were of enemy origin regardless of flag. Bryan pointed out
that with the German declaration in effect, British use of U.S. flags would
afford them no protection but would be a serious and constant menace to
American vessels.
Bryan expressed hope that the British Government would
do all that was in its power to restrain this practice. If London failed
to do this and the German Navy was to sink U.S. vessels that resulted in the
loss of American lives, a measure of responsibility would rest with London.20
On February 12 Ambassador Gerard cabled Bryan.
He informed him that German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Gottlieb E.
G. von Jagow was preparing a written response to Bryan's communication.
Having spoken to Jagow, Gerard was convinced that Berlin would withdraw its
proclamation if the British Government would allow food for the civilian population
to enter Germany.21
Von Jagow's communiqu� arrived at the German Embassy
on February 15. Just as Gerard expected, Berlin rested its decision to
withdraw the war-zone proclamation upon London's actions in the naval war.
Von Jagow first dealt with British practice of arming
merchant vessels. He noted reports of British merchant ships sailing in
groups and ramming German submarines while their crews conducted
searches. Some British merchant crew members had supposedly thrown hand
grenades at the submarines and others attempted to overpower search parties as
they came aboard. He also noted the substantial prize offered to any
merchant vessel crew that could bring about the first destruction of a German
submarine. Von Jagow contended that because of all this merchant shipping
in the war zone could no longer be considered undefended and thus should be
open to attack without "visit and search."22
The German secretary of state went on to cover the use
of neutral flags. He charged that the British were using every means at
their disposal to disguise the nationality of their merchant ships. As a
result it had become practically impossible for the Germans to identify truly
neutral vessels. With "visit and search" discontinued because
of the aforementioned attacks, Von Jagow stated that there could be no
assurance of safety for neutral shipping in the war zone. He claimed
Germany's naval policy was justified by "murderous" British methods
and held that British efforts to destroy legitimate German trade with neutral
states was designed to starve Germany to death.23
Later on February 15 Bryan sent a memorandum to
President Wilson regarding the German message. In it he stated that it
might be possible to secure German withdrawal from the proclaimed war zone
around the British Isles in return for positive action on the food
question. Believing the British were acting without justification, Bryan
spoke of working with the German Government. He assured the President
that arrangements could be made so that no food entering Germany would go to
military or government personnel. American organizations could even
distribute the food if necessary. This he felt would negate any British
excuse for not allowing food past the blockade.
Bryan appealed to the President's strong sense of
morality. He said it was against American ideals to allow the starvation
of German women and children. This would arouse those inclined to
sympathize with the Germans (of which Bryan himself was showing an inclination).24
The next day Bryan cabled Page in London. He
asked Page to inform the British Government that the Germans were willing to
allow American organizations to distribute food. This should remove any
British justification for preventing the foodstuffs from reaching their
destination. Page was to make a particular appeal to British Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs Sir Edward Grey, reminding him that keeping food from
noncombatants would create an unfavorable impression on world opinion, and it
would cast the United States in an unfavorable light if her government was
inactive. Page was to push the point that the German war zone order might
be withdrawn if the matter of food to Germany could be remedied.25
On February 16 the State Department sent a letter to
the German Embassy informing it of Bryan's cable to London. In addition
Bryan cabled Gerard urging him to get in touch with Colonel House
immediately. President Wilson had requested that Gerard act only on
House's advice.26
House was perhaps better informed than any individual
on how to deal with the stubborn British. But at the time he had his
hands full dealing with Sir Edward Grey. House wrote to Wilson on the
18th with a pessimistic report. Grey had told him that Great Britain
would continue the war indefinitely unless the Germans agreed both to evacuate
invaded territory and to guarantee permanent peace. These were obviously
not going to happen. House asked that the British avoid "closing the
peace door too tightly," just in case the Germans really desired it.
Grey merely replied, "You will be a very clever man if you can do that
successfully."27
Colonel House went on to tell the President that the
situation was growing hourly worse as a result of the German declaration
regarding merchantmen. Grey was continuously putting off discussion on
the issue, which House attributed to what he called the "usual British
slowness."28
House's frequent discussions with Grey were largely
informal, but they were full of indicators as to why diplomatic interaction
between Washington and London was going the way it was. Indeed, many of
their conversations turned into official messages to the State Department.
Grey's memoirs show his lack of interest in keeping the
door to peace open. He was certain that House blamed German militarism
for the war. House, he wrote, saw the war as a struggle between democracy
and an undemocratic antithesis to American ideals. For the most part this
was the same viewpoint held by President Wilson. But unlike Wilson, House
thought it would be a mistake to bring the United States into the war
prematurely. Rapid and total victory of either side would offer the least
chance to utilize American influence to its fullest potential. A stalemate
could make decisive and paramount use of American influence if it was exercised
with full support from the American public. Grey wrote that House felt
stalemate was the most likely outcome. This partially explains why Grey
was so stubborn about working for peace in 1915.29
To others relations between Britain and the United
States did not seem so troubled. Bryan wrote to the President in February
18, referring to a telegram from Ambassador Walter Hines Page, received on the
12th. This telegram noted the British government might propose to Berlin
that it would keep food off the absolute contraband list. The problem was
that, again, the British wanted too much in return. London would only
consider this proposal if Berlin agreed to halt the laying of mines and
submarine attacks on merchant ships. To the secretary of state this
offered what he styled a "ray of hope."30
Bryan felt it would be worthwhile to negotiate with
the Germans, as he felt they would be more conciliatory than the British.
He wanted to propose that U.S. agents consign food destined for non-combatants
to retailers licensed by the German government. Any license would specify
that the food would not be subject to requisition. Any violation of its
terms would result in a forfeiture of the right to receive foodstuffs.
In return for food shipments the U.S. government would
require five things of the Germans. First, they could not employ floating
mines; all mines would have to be chained in place. Second, any mines
laid would have to be for defensive purposes at the entrances to harbors with
the German Government's stamp on them. Third, the mines would have to be
designed to become inoperative if detached. Fourth, submarines could not
attack commercial vessels. And, finally, neutral flags could not be used
aboard merchant ships of belligerent nations.31
However naive it may have been to suggest these conditions, at the time they
seemed perfectly reasonable to Bryan.
Inside Bryan's letter to Wilson was a message from
Gerard in Berlin. It conveyed the German Government's request for
American understanding of alleged British neutrality violations. It also
outlined the consequences to Germany of inaction on the part of neutral nations
and promised that Berlin would do its best to keep from attacking American
vessels.
The Germans pointed out the danger to ships entering
legitimately mined areas. Absolute safety could only be achieved if
vessels stayed out of the war zone. Gerard believed Washington misunderstood
Berlin's intentions. Berlin had announced its plan to destroy only enemy
vessels in the war zone, not all merchant ships. But Gerard reminded his
government that dangers remained because of the continued British use of
neutral flags and ongoing practice of neutral nations shipping contraband
traffic through the war zone. Gerard did, however, convey Berlin's
appreciation for American protests against the British use of neutral
flags. In return, German submarine commanders had been instructed to
abstain from violence against American shipping, provided contraband was not
found aboard those vessels. Finally, Gerard expressed the German
Government's appreciation of American efforts toward persuading the British to
allow food to enter Germany.32
It is interesting to note that this message from
Gerard was received on the 17th, before Bryan outlined American demands to
Wilson. Yet Bryan's note to the President covered some of the proposed
demands, namely an end to attacks on neutral shipping, disapproval of the use
of neutral flags, and keeping mines in designated areas. While there was
no mention of floating mines, nor mines becoming inoperative if detached, it
still represented progress.
ENDNOTES
1. Robert Leckie, The Wars of America - Volume II
(New York: Harper Collins, 1992), p. 616.
2. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1914 Supplement (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1928), File No.
763.72112/545a, p. 372.
3. Ibid., p. 373.
4. Ibid., p. 375.
5. Ibid., File No. 763.72112/468, p. 376.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Arthur S. Link, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson,
Volume 31 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 543.
9. Ibid., p. 544.
10. Ibid.
11. Charles Seymour ed., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (New
York: Houghton Mifflin, 1926), p. 315.
12. Foreign Relations Papers, 1914 Supplement, File No.
763.72/1430, p. 93.
13. Ibid., File No. 763.72/1428, p. 93.
14. Link, Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Volume 32, pp. 194-95.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Foreign Relations Papers, 1915 Supplement, File No.
763.72/1434, p. 98.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., File No. 811.0151/33, pp. 100-1.
21. Ibid., File No. 763.72,1451, p. 102.
22. Ibid., File No. 763.72/1519, p. 104.
23. Ibid., p. 105.
24. Link, Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Volume 32, pp. 235-36.
25. Foreign Relations Papers, 1915 Supplement, File No.
763.72/1457a, p. 107.
26. Ibid., File No. 763.7212/1386c, p. 108.
27. Seymour, Intimate Papers of Colonel House Volume 32, p. 328.
28. Ibid., p. 379.
29. Sir Edward Grey, Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916, Volume 2 (New
York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1925), p. 126.
30. Link, Papers of Woodrow Wilson Volume 32, p. 249.
31. Ibid., p. 250.
32. Ibid., p. 251.