Chapter 8
The Gulflight and the
On May 1 German submarine U-30 torpedoed the
American oil tanker Gulflight, The tanker had been following two
British patrol boats into the
Word of the incident reached Secretary of State Bryan
on May 3, and he cabled Ambassador Page the same day for a detailed
report. He heard back from Page the next day. The ambassador said
that the British Admiralty was holding the tanker in the Scilly Islands but was
about to turn it over to a salvage company. Depositions of the tanker's officers
and crew were being taken in Penzance and Page was awaiting the results of an
investigation.2
Bryan cabled Page again on May 6 to request
information on the activity of the Gulflight at the time of the
attack. He said that the Gulf Refining Company, managing owner of the
tanker, had informed him that she had been torpedoed without warning while
"following British patrol boats to Bishop." Bryan wanted Page
to find out from the tanker's officers and crew whether the Gulflight
was under convoy or protection of patrol boats. If she was not, he was
supposed to ascertain what communication passed between the patrol boats and
the Gulflight and why the tanker was following them.3
Colin Simpson noted in his book The Lusitania
that the Gulflight was forced to follow the British patrol boats.
He concluded that the British steam drifter Clara Alice had spotted U-30
and proceeded to contact Royal Navy patrol boats the Filey and Iago, which then
began a search for the German submarine. On the way back to their last
position, Filey and Iago stopped the Gulflight to examine
her papers. Unsatisfied with them and suspicious that the tanker was
there to refuel the German submarine, the British commander had ordered the Gulflight
to follow the two craft to the nearest port, which was St. Mary's in the Scilly
Islands. On their way into port they spotted the U-30 surfacing
ahead of them. The captain of U-30 mistook the tanker to be
British and under convoy. The captain of the Filey then attempted
to ram U-30 with his vessel. The submarine then dove quickly and
fired the torpedo that struck the Gulflight.4
Gerard cabled Bryan on the 6th with a memorandum from
the German Foreign Office. This reminded Washington that during the
previous weeks neutral ships had repeatedly fallen victim to German attacks in
waters designated as a war zone. Berlin asked that Washington give its
full attention to these facts and strongly suggested that American shipping be
warned against traversing the danger areas. If the American vessels
absolutely had to enter the war zone, Berlin recommended they make their
neutral markings as plain as possible and illuminate them at night.5
Gerard cabled Bryan on May 7 saying that the German
Admiralty had no information on the Gulflight incident. He
promised to cable again as soon as information was forthcoming.6 It did not matter as May 7 was the
day of the Lusitania disaster. Gerard cabled Bryan that day with
news of the loss of the Lusitania, but no information on passenger
casualties.
Bryan cabled back the next day asking Gerard to secure
a German Government report on the Lusitania. He mentioned the
latest reports in the United States placing the loss of life at more than a
thousand people, many of them Americans.7
Gerard cabled Bryan on May 10 with a message from
German State Secretary of the Foreign Office Gottlieb von Jagow. The
German secretary's tone in the memorandum was almost cynical. He began by
expressing Berlin's deepest sympathy at the loss of American life aboard the Lusitania,
but he placed responsibility with London. It was the British who had
forced Berlin into retaliatory measures by stopping foodstuffs from entering
Germany. He also brought up the fact that British merchant ships were
armed and often tried to ram German submarines, making it impossible to treat
the ships as true merchantmen. Von Jagow called Washington's attention to
the fact that the Lusitania had, on previous voyages, carried war
materiel. Finally, he stated that the Lusitania was liable to
destruction and London should have assessed the risk. In spite of
sympathy for Americans lost, the German Government was forced to conclude that
Washington preferred to listen to British promises rather than pay attention to
German warnings.8
Gerard understood the German Government better than
any other American in the Foreign Service. His memoirs show that he had
by this time lost faith in Berlin's capability to keep the peace with the
United States. He wrote that "Kaiserism" was capable of trying
anything in the hope of victory while showing a special disillusionment with
the Kaiser himself. Gerard wrote that Kaiser Wilhelm II was "the
centre of the system which has brought the world to a despair and misery such as
it never has known since the dawn of history." The Kaiser had the
soul of a conqueror whose "eyes were so blinded with the sheen of his own
glory that they do not see the mutilated corpses, the crime, the pestilence,
the hunger, the incalculable sorrow that sweeps the earth. . . ."
Gerard blamed the Kaiser alone for the war: "everywhere he has brought the
dark angel of mourning to millions upon millions of desolate homes."9
By sinking the Lusitania Germany had caused
irreparable damage to relations with Washington. This time the loss of
American life was high enough to alarm the American public and unite it against
Germany. On May 17 Gerard cabled Bryan with a section of an article
published in the Lokal Anzeiger newspaper. It stated that Germany
would continue to fight the war as it was currently fighting it and that it
would be done with a clear conscience.10
Bryan obviously read this as a crisis, because he cabled Gerard the next day
and warned him to remain in constant contact with American consuls in Germany.
He also told Gerard to remind the consuls to keep constant communication with
the American citizens in their districts, so that they would be prepared for
prompt instructions.11 He
obviously foresaw serious problems in getting President Wilson to ignore the
torpedoing of the
ENDNOTES
1. Colin Simpson, The
2. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the
Government Printing Office, 1928), File
No. 300.115G95, p. 378.
3. Ibid., p. 381.
4. Simpson, The Lusitania., pp. 118-19.
5. Foreign Relations Papers, 1915 Supplement, File No.
763.72/1743, p. 384.
6. Ibid., File No. 300.115G95/9, p. 384.
7. Ibid., File No. 857L97/4a, p. 385.
8. Ibid., File No. 841.857L97/8, p. 389.
9. James Watson Gerard, Face to Face with Kaiserism
(New York: George H. Doran Company, 1918), pp. 47-49.
10. Foreign Relations Papers. 1915 Supplement, File No.
763.72/1771., pp. 398-99.
11. Ibid., File No. 763.72/1770, p. 398.